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The term collision refers to an event in which two or more
bodies strike or come together in physics. However, in terms of
information security, it is a situation that occurs when two or more
distinct inputs into a security system produce identical outputs.
Collision is undesirable in some security applications. For example
in the case of the hash function, which produces a unique fixed-
size string (hash code) from any input and is widely used in data
integrity and password verifications techniques. If an attacker finds
an input which will produce a hash code identical to a legal one, he
can access the system as a legal user. Similarly, any watermarking
system should also have the property of collision resistance. Other-
wise, it is impossible to distinguish the ownership of any water-
marked property.
Double random phase encoding (DRPE) has been used for opti-
cal encryption, image hiding and watermarking [1–3]. Recently
there have been several studies pointing out that random phase
encoding systems are vulnerable to chosen-cyphertext, chosen-ll rights reserved.plaintext and known-plaintext attacks [4–8]. However, to date
there is no study on the collision resistance of this technique. So
our motivation in this manuscript is to study the collision property
of DRPE.
2. Collision algorithm
In DRPE, an input image or watermark, f ðx; yÞ, is encoded into a
stationary white noise, i.e., the cyphertext gðx; yÞ, using two statis-
tically independent random phase distributions /ðx; yÞ and wðu; vÞ
located in a 4f system at the input and Fourier planes, respectively.
For image hiding and watermarking applications, gðx; yÞ is then
embedded into a host image to yield a watermarked image [2,3].
The host image does not have much effect to our analysis because
of the reason stated in the next paragraph. Here we just focus on
phase encoding in our discussions. The encoding process can be
mathematically expressed as [1]
gðx; yÞ ¼FfFff ðx; yÞ exp½j/ðx; yÞg exp½jwðu; vÞg; ð1Þ
where ðx; yÞ and ðu; vÞ are the coordinates of the spatial and Fourier
domains, respectively, and the symbol Ffg represents Fourier
transform. The two random phase distributions /ðx; yÞ and wðu; vÞ,
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system. In general it is difficult to recover the watermark, f ðx; yÞ, di-
rectly from the cyphertext gðx; yÞ without using these two keys. The
purpose of the cryptanalysis presented in [4–8] is to retrieve part, or
all, of the information of these keys with a priori but incomplete
knowledge of the plaintext and/or the cyphertext, and eventually re-
trieve any plaintext encrypted using the same key-set
½/ðx; yÞ;wðu; vÞ. Collision, on the other hand, involves finding an-
other key-set, ½/0ðx; yÞ;w0ðu; vÞ, which will encrypt a different
f 0ðx; yÞ to the same gðx; yÞ, the cyphertext of f ðx; yÞ. If such a collision
exists, the illegal user can claim the ownership of any property, such
as digital art, watermarked with gðx; yÞ, which is legally owned by
another person.
To address this problem, we assume that the illegal user can ac-
cess the full complex cyphertext gðx; yÞ. This assumption is reason-
able because in some watermarking systems based on random
phase encoding, gðx; yÞ is directly added into a host image to obtain
thewatermarked image [2]. If the host image is available as in some
applications [9], it is easy to extract the cyphtertext. In the cases
when the host image and gðx; yÞ are not separable, it does not affect
the performance of the following algorithm since the spectrum of
the watermarked image can then be used as the constraint in the
Fourier plane. So we can neglect the host image in our discussions.
With gðx; yÞ one could also obtain its full complex Fourier transform:
Gðu; vÞ ¼ jGðu; vÞj exp½jbðu; vÞ ¼F1fgðx; yÞg: ð2Þ
In this case the collision problem can be stated as: Find a real
image, f 0ðx; yÞ, and two phase distributions, exp½j/0ðx; yÞ and
exp½jw0ðu; vÞ, so that the following equation is valid:
jGðu; vÞj exp½jbðu; vÞ ¼Fff 0ðx; yÞ exp½j/0ðx; yÞg exp½jw0ðu; vÞ: ð3Þ
An illegal user who intends to act as a legal user has complete
flexibility in choosing a self-defined real image as the input colli-
sion f 0ðx; yÞ. Once such an input image is chosen, the amplitudes
on both sides of Eq. (3) are determined. The aim then reduces to
finding the phase exp½j/0ðx; yÞ, or equivalently exp½jw0ðu; vÞ, given
the two intensity measurements, respectively, in the spatial and
Fourier planes. This problem can be solved using an iterative Fou-
rier transform (IFT) algorithm [10]. Assuming the algorithm has
reached the k;th iteration and retrieved the phase exp½j/0kðx; yÞ,
one can form an estimate of the image in the spatial domain
f 0kðx; yÞ ¼j f 0ðx; yÞ j exp½j/0kðx; yÞ. The succeeding iteration then con-
sists of the following steps:
(I) Fourier transform the estimate of the image:Fkðu; vÞ ¼ jFkðu; vÞj exp½jakðu; vÞ ¼Fff 0kðx; yÞg; ð4Þ
(II) Replace the modulus of the resulting spectrum, j Fkðu; vÞ j, by
j Gðu; vÞ j to form the estimate of the Fourier transform:
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rF 0kðu; vÞ ¼ jGðu; vÞj exp½jakðu; vÞ; ð5ÞEr(III) Inverse Fourier transform the modulated complex amplitude
back to the spatial domain:-3f^
0
kþ1ðx; yÞ ¼ jf^ 0kþ1ðx; yÞj exp½j/0kþ1ðx; yÞ ¼F1fF 0kðu; vÞg; ð6Þ10
(IV) Replace the resulting modulus, jf^ 0kþ1ðx; yÞ j, by f 0ðx; yÞ:f 0kþ1ðx; yÞ ¼ f 0ðx; yÞ exp½j/0kþ1ðx; yÞ: ð7Þ
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Fig. 1. The converging behavior of the algorithm in the logarithm scale. The MSE is
calculated using the formula M2
PM
j¼1
PM
i¼1½Iði; jÞ j I0kði; jÞ j 2, where Iði; jÞ and I0kði; jÞ
are the spatial constraint and the retrieved image at the kth iteration, and M M is
the size of the image. As explained in the text, this plot shows the behavior of the
algorithm for both amplitude-encoded and phase-encoded input schemes.In general there is no analytic solution for Eq. (3), but feasible
solutions always exist [10]. The above iterative process is repeated
until the convergent criteria are satisfied. Normally the converging
factor can be chosen as the mean square error (MSE) or the
correlation coefficient between f 0ðx; yÞ and j f^ 0ðx; yÞ j. Since the IFTalgorithm is essentially an error-reduction algorithm, it is therefore
reasonable to determine the convergence by tracking the MSE and
test whether it is smaller than a predefined threshold value or not.
When the iterative process converges after N iterations, the
phase distribution /0ðx; yÞ ¼ /0Nðx; yÞ numerically obtained is appar-
ently one of the keys expected. According to the description in Step
II, the Fourier spectrum j FNðu; vÞ j of f 0ðx; yÞ exp½j/0Nðx; yÞ should
satisfy the Fourier domain constraint, that is, j FNðu; vÞ jj Gðu; vÞ j.
However the phase component exp½jaNðu; vÞ may not, therefore
one must add an additional phase to this to satisfy the phase con-
straint. This phase difference can be regarded as the key w0ðu; vÞ ¼
bðu; vÞ  aNðu; vÞ.
3. Computer simulation
We perform computer simulations to demonstrate the above
theoretical analysis. The image we used as the legal watermark
f ðx; yÞ is the image ‘‘elaine” of 512  512 pixels in size, which can
be found in the USC-SIPI database [11]. Following Eq. (1) it is easy
to calculate the corresponding cyphertext gðx; yÞ using two random
phase masks exp½j/ðx; yÞ and exp½jwðu; vÞ, which are white noise
distributions and not shown in the text. Once the collision f 0ðx; yÞ
is chosen, for example the image ‘‘lena” [11], the above algorithm
can be applied. The converging criteria used in the simulation is
the MSE with the threshold value ct equal to, for example, 0.0015.
The algorithm converges within 100 iterations. The converging
behavior in the logarithm scale is shown by the curve with trian-
gle marks in Fig. 1. One can see that the error curve drops very
fast in the first few iterations, and then becomes much flatter
but keeps decreasing. This is the typical converging behavior
of the error-reduction algorithm [10]. Two random phase distri-
butions exp½j/0ðx; yÞ and exp½jw0ðu; vÞ were then retrieved.
Generally, these two distributions are different from the legal
phase keys. The phase differences between the legal and illegal
phase keys, D/ðx; yÞ ¼ modf½/ðx; yÞ  /0ðx; yÞ;2pg and Dwðu; vÞ ¼
modf½wðu; vÞ  w0ðu; vÞ;2pg, also have random noise feature.
In our simulation, the expected values of D/ðx; yÞ and Dwðu; vÞ
are 3.1368 and 3.1369 radians, which are close to p; and the stan-
dard deviations of both are found to be 1.8144. In order to more
clearly show the random characters of these two phase maps, we
plot their histograms in Fig. 2, which indicates they are uniformed
distributions between ½0;2p. Even though the retrieved illegal
phase keys are significantly different from the legal ones, they
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high quality as shown in Fig. 3, the MSE between which and ‘‘lena”
is 0.0015, and the normalized correlation coefficient between them
is 0.9911.
Note that we did not impose any restriction on the selection of
the real collision image f 0ðx; yÞ, the initialization of the algorithm,
or the spectrum of the cyphertext in the above discussions and
simulations. The convergence property holds for all the applica-
tions of the error-reduction algorithms as quoted from [10]. What
this means is that the illegal user has a lot of flexibility in choosing0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
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Fig. 2. The histograms of the phase differences between the legal and illegal phase
keys: (a) modf½/ðx; yÞ  /0 ðx; yÞ;2pg and (b) modf½wðu; vÞ  w0ðu; vÞ;2pg.
Fig. 3. The high-quality collision image retrieved in the simulations.f 0ðx; yÞ; and he can always retrieve two feasible keys exp½j/0ðx; yÞ
and exp½jw0ðu; vÞ from the chosen image and the obtained Fourier
spectrum. Therefore the algorithm converges regardless of whose
Fourier spectrum, gðx; yÞ, in the case of encryption, or the weighted
summation of gðx; yÞ þ a host image, in the case of watermarking,
being used. This property also results in very serious problems in
practical applications: anybody who can access gðx; yÞ can claim
his or her ownership of anything watermarked by gðx; yÞ. Once
many such claim the ownership of an identical image involving
specific f 0ðx; yÞ and phase key-pair, it would become difficult for a
moderator to conduct a technical assessment regarding property
rights.
Even if the watermark f ðx; yÞ is pre-encoded into a phase-only
function, exp½j2pf ðx; yÞ, it is still possible to find collisions although
such pre-processing is helpful in enhancing the difficulty of crypt-
analysis, as is also the case for encryption [12]. In this case, one just
needs to change the constraint in the spatial domain (Step IV in the
algorithm) to be a unity amplitude. In this study two random-like
phase distributions exp½j/0ðx; yÞ and exp½jw0ðu; vÞ can always be
found so that the algorithm converges [10]. It is shown in Fig. 1 that
the algorithm converges faster due to the unity amplitude of the
spatial constraints in this case. Then /0ðx; yÞ can be written as the
summation of any collision image 2pf 0ðx; yÞ and a random-like dis-
tribution, i.e., exp½j/0ðx; yÞ ¼ expfj½2pf 0ðx; yÞ þ /00ðx; yÞg. It is
exp½j/00ðx; yÞ and exp½jw0ðu; vÞ that now serve as the illegal
keys.4. Conclusion
Cryptographic hash functions are used for authentication (digi-
tal signatures such as watermarks), message integrity, and pass-
word verification. Collisions in such functions pose serious
security risks. While there is no collision risk with DRPE when
the key is not part of the input (by definition, because it is a sym-
metric encryption technique), we have shown that DRPE admits
collisions when the key is regarded as an input variable and DRPE
is used as a cryptographic hash function. Although it is a necessary
condition for ideal encryption [14], this property represents a
weakness that needs to be fixed for DRPE to be used for authenti-
cation in this way.
The existence of collisions arises because of the linear nature of
the system and the methodology of phase encoding. Although the
introduction of additional detection system in the Fourier domain
may be helpful in allowing a moderator to assess the ownership
[4,13] when it is necessary, some information about the spectrum
embedded in the watermarked image is then necessary. This addi-
tional information however may be utilized by the illegal user to
analyze the watermark and the keys.
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